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Saul Levmore† 
This Essay suggests the necessity of a co-evolutionary process among 
empirical and theoretical advances in law and economics. Empirical work 
alone is suggestive, but should not be taken too seriously. The weaknesses 
in empirical work, and by this I mostly mean regression-based work which 
has come to dominate law and economics, lead to a kind of virus that be-
gins with over-statements and misapprehensions, and then spreads as more 
scholars copy the mistakes and engage in empirical work as a means of 
entry into the field. Regression-based work will become suspect as its cur-
rent assumptions are questioned, and as replication failures reveal its 
weaknesses. Empirical work in law and economics looks very different 
when underlying distributions are not easily probed with regressions but 
are understood as reflecting power-laws, or as simply random. Once incon-
venient distributions are acknowledged, the key question is why observa-
tions might be distributed in this fashion. This is likely to be a task for the-
orists as law and economics enters its next phase. On the other hand, 
empirical work has been important and has made law and economics a re-
spectable science. The claim here is that good empirical work—especially 
in law and economics—is hard to produce, and it is important not to over-
value its products. Moreover, it is more useful when combined with good 
theory. 
The focus in this Essay is on three weaknesses of empirical work, 
though in a larger sense most of the problems come from omitted variables 
and, in some cases, insufficiently large data sets. First, much of the empiri-
cal work in law and economics is driven by models that rely on error mini-
mization techniques, and these techniques are unreliable when errors are 
surprisingly and unevenly distributed (that is, when they suffer from het-
eroscedasticity). Second, it is likely that when empiricists connect data with 
a model, the process is flawed because there might be a hidden transition 
to a second distribution. Discovering multiple distributions is likely to re-
quire theoretical work. These and other problems are exacerbated by the 
likelihood that conclusions are based on the tail end of data sets, inasmuch 
as scholarly journals only bring to light statistically significant results. In 
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addition, empirical work in law and economics suffers from the absence of 
sizeable data sets. Without such sets it is difficult to test conclusions and to 
escape the omnipresent challenge of omitted variables. Reversal para-
doxes are yet another serious problem, and especially so in the absence of 
large data sets.  
The larger and more optimistic claim is that data and theory can and 
must work together. Regressions have come to play a critical role in law 
and economics, and econometric methods have improved over time. It has 
become apparent that data can suggest theories, and theories can be tested, 
to a degree, with data. But some theoretical insights are so convincing that 
data testing, though comforting even when flawed, may be unnecessary—
and it may, in any event, be tainted by the spread of the theory. It is likely 
that empirical work in law and economics will find itself in retreat, even as 
its quality improves because of renewed attention to theory. 
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This Essay will not be the first to emphasize the weakness of empirical 
work that is not motivated by theory.1 My larger aim is to stress and predict 
the continuing co-evolution of these two strands of law and economics.2 
Along the way, I develop several themes. First, and perhaps most contro-
versial, is the idea that a great deal of empirical work in law and economics 
(as in other fields) is suggestive, but is not to be taken too seriously. Indeed, 
I predict that the replication crisis, best associated with psychology, will 
soon find its way to law and economics.3 The weaknesses in empirical work, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. See, e.g., JUDEA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT (2018); Richard N. Boyd, On the Current Status of the Issue of 
Scientific Realism, 19 ERKENNTNIS 45 (1983); Tjalling C. Koopmans, Measurement Without The-
ory, 29 REV. ECON. & STAT. 161 (1947). By “theory” I mean something interesting that explains 
how a part of the world works. 
 2. For a general discussion on the early development of empirical legal scholarship, see 
Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision 
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 820.  
 3. See Scott E. Maxwell, Michael Y. Lau & George S. Howard, Is Psychology Suffering 
from a Replication Crisis? What Does “Failure to Replicate” Really Mean?, 70 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 487 (2015). Replication crises are not limited to psychology. There is good reason 
to think that most of the social sciences and many of the hard sciences are replete with 
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by which I usually mean regression-based work that is dominant in law and 
economics, are a kind of virus that begins with over-statements and misap-
prehensions and then spreads as scholars copy the mistakes of their prede-
cessors, and construct more regressions as a means of entry into the field. 
Good empirical work is simply hard to do, and we need to be aware of its 
limitations. I focus on three weaknesses of empirical work in a field that 
rarely has the luxury of large data sets. First, much of the empirical work 
in law and economics is driven by models that are formed by error minimi-
zation techniques, and these techniques are unreliable when errors are sur-
prisingly and unevenly distributed (that is, when they suffer from hetero-
scedasticity), as is likely to be the case when the true distribution of 
variables is not normal, but instead conforms to a power law, to one of 
various sigmoid (convex and then concave, s-curve) functions, or reflects 
midstream changes from one distribution to another, including a segment 
of randomness. I aim to show that while empiricists like to say that “some 
data is better than no data,” the seemingly obvious reliance or insistence 
on data-driven analysis, is misplaced or even reckless, because there is of-
ten reason to think that “some data” often leads to misleading conclusions. 
As we will see, omitted variables are at the root of the problem. Most em-
piricists are of aware of this problem, but the problem is insufficiently ap-
preciated, and the responses to it come with problems of their own.  
The weaknesses commonly encountered in empirical work reflect the 
well-known difficulty of moving from correlations to claims of causation. 
Great strides have been made in recent times, in what is known as the “cau-
sation revolution,” to bridge this gap,4 but much of the work has relied 
upon, or at least been made easier with, linear models. Linearity is often a 
convenient rather than a supportable assumption, as explained in Part I. 
At times the assumption of linearity does little harm because there are nat-
ural or clever experiments available, random sampling may be possible, 
and enough data is available to test predictions. This is done by setting 
aside some unseen data, or at least dividing it by predicting future devel-
opments, in ways that reduce the likelihood that omitted variables do the 
work.5 Testing regressions on set aside data can be seen as a kind of inter-
nal replication. Ideally, and especially in law and economics, insights are 
based on theories. Theories about why correlations are found lead to pre-
dictions and tests. Put differently, econometrics is a game of looking for 
treatment effects, but doing so requires that the groups being compared 
are truly comparable, so that the groups are exchangeable and attention 
can be focused on the variable being studied. In practice, there is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                
unreproducible, inconsistent, published, and oft-cited, studies. See Alvaro de Menard, What’s 
Wrong with Social Science and How to Fix It: Reflections After Reading 2578 Papers, FANTASTIC 
ANACHRONISM (Sep. 11, 2020), https://fantasticanachronism.com/2020/09/11/whats-wrong-with-
social-science-and-how-to-fix-it [https://perma.cc/F9VA-TKJR]. 
 4. PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 9. 
 5. See id.; Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules, 
Standards, and Judicial Discretion, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2019). 
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persistent problem of pollution by omitted variables. In some fields, ran-
domized experiments with a large number of observations solve this prob-
lem. This is normally impossible in law and economics. 
Part II then suggests a second problem that persists even if we can 
overcome the inconvenience of non-linearity. It must often be the case that 
what appears as one phenomenon, with empiricists striving to describe it 
with one line or curve, is really best described with two or more distribu-
tions—and perhaps theories. Readers might think of this as a subset, or 
extreme version, of the problem of omitted variables, the mainstay of the 
discussion in Part I, but it is useful to think of it as a separate matter. In 
passing, the discussion highlights yet another problem that is related to the 
familiar complaint that scholarly journals only bring to light statistically 
significant results; we may be looking at a tail end of data in the first place. 
Part III sets aside reasons to be nervous about imagined distributions and 
focuses on one of the many reasons to question conclusions drawn from 
relatively small data sets, as is typical in law and economics. A simple ex-
ample suggests why this problem of Simpson’s Paradoxes, or reversals, is 
beguiling but also serious in the absence of a very large number of obser-
vations.  
Part IV turns more directly to the partnership between data analysis 
and theory. The discussion considers problems for which data suggests the-
ories and, in contrast, where theories come first, and are then tested with 
data. Some theoretical insights are so convincing that data testing, com-
forting even though flawed, may be unnecessary—and testing may, in any 
event, be tainted because the decisionmakers who are observed are aware 
of the theoretical insights, and able to respond to them. The discussion 
concludes that we should expect empirical and theoretical work to evolve 
in combination. The recent surge of empirical work in law and economics 
will be slowed not only by the problems described in Parts I, II, and III, but 
also by the exhaustion of theories that have been evaluated. Further em-
pirical work will eventually require the development of new theories.  
The analysis here repeatedly refers to the relative paucity of data 
available to empiricists in law and economics. Statistical techniques often 
involve sampling, whether intentional or forced, which is to say taking a set 
of observations in order to say something about the larger pool of actual 
events or potentially available observations.6 At times, the larger set will 
be experienced in the future, while in other settings the smaller set is used 
to predict the larger one because it is costly to gather data.7 In both cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 6. Ever since William Gossett wanted to test the quality of the hops being used by Guin-
ness, sampling and measuring errors has been the main source of employment for many a statisti-
cian. See Dan Kopf, The Guinness Brewer Who Revolutionized Statistics, PRICEONOMICS (Dec. 
11, 2015), https://priceonomics.com/the-guinness-brewer-who-revolutionized-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/4KDW-X28H]. 
 7. PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 155, offer an excellent if counterintuitive ex-
planation, when discussing the “potential outcomes” framework deployed by modern 
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there is the problem highlighted in Part I; the techniques that extrapolate 
from a small set to a larger one make assumptions that are often false, and 
trouble follows. The distribution of real-life data (and the errors thus iden-
tified in the subset) may be inconvenient for the empiricist. A good theory 
can avoid this problem, but this requires data analysis to be guided, or at 
least instigated, by a theory. It argues for moving from theory to data, ra-
ther than from data to theory (or no theory). Empirical work often tests 
theories by testing over time, as time offers a means of setting aside data. 
Unfortunately, this strategy brings on a new set of omitted variables, 
simply because things change over time. Straightforward examples are pro-
vided to support these arguments, and they suggest that data science, at 
least with respect to law and economics, is likely to experience its own s-
curve—a rise and then a fall, or a leveling off. 
I. Questioning Empirical Work: Power Laws and Other Inconvenient 
Distributions 
It is plain that law and economics has left its first theoretical phase 
and prioritized empirical work. The leading journals are now filled with 
empirical work, and newcomers to the academy are likely to be trained in 
empirical methods. With enticing claims about what their empirical work 
suggests or proves, student-run journals have become useful partners in 
the rush to overclaim and gain attention. In some fields, like corporate law, 
international law, and criminal law, entry at the top is virtually impossible 
                                                                                                                                                                                
econometricians. In testing whether a flu vaccine actually causes flu (as some critics suggest, be-
cause they observe that some people who take the vaccine do get the flu), they point to four pos-
sibilities, or groups, and call them: doomed, causative, preventive, and immune. Doomed means 
they get the flu even if vaccinated. Causative means they get the flu only if they are vaccinated (as 
alleged and now being tested). Preventive means the vaccination works with some significant 
probability. Immune means they do not get the flu whether or not vaccinated. The genius is that 
there is no need to worry about (and control for) every conceivable confounding variable. But the 
critical assumption of this strategy is that the four groups are evenly balanced in the data, or di-
vided in a known configuration. Without this balance or knowledge, we cannot say whether the 
treatment and control groups are exchangeable. The very point is that counterfactuals are unob-
servable, so that the groups are surely unbalanced. Econometricians are left comparing apples and 
oranges.  
 This example skirts around the additional problem created by unimagined omitted varia-
bles. The vaccine may be dangerous for someone who consumes alcohol, or perhaps entirely ef-
fective for one who does not. In the language of the potential outcomes approach, there may be 
other paths from A to X. When omitted variables can be identified, they can be tested in order to 
say something about causation between A and X. But if the omitted variable is unanticipated, then 
some theory is required to be comfortable with the idea of looming omitted variables. Imagine 
again that we are testing whether A causes X, after observing a correlation between the two. B 
and C might be relevant omitted variables, and we aim to find out whether B and C provide an-
other path between A and X, so that the AX correlation does not mean that one causes the other. 
We might find that A is attached to B or that A is attached to BC when those two are both found. 
We can now see whether A and X connect in the absence of B and C. This is the genius of the 
potential outcomes approach, but it requires some testing for the presence and absence of BC. AX 
may in fact be connected through EF, and if we are unaware of that possible connection, we cannot 
test for it. It may be E that brings on X. 
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without empirical training and ambitions. Special attention is given to peo-
ple who come equipped with good data sets, even when it is hard to say 
anything definitive or novel with these sets and no new theory.8 This is the 
age of empirical law and economics. In the beginning of this phase, corre-
lations were revealed. To take a well-known example, a heavily examined 
question in corporate law was whether the popularity of Delaware as a 
state of incorporation was a “race to the bottom” or, through familiar com-
petitive pressures, to the top.9 The empirical work began with two compet-
ing theories, and sought to declare one the winner. Early work revealed 
that firms that moved to Delaware were more likely to experience a rise in 
market value rather than a drop, so that Delaware appeared to offer good 
news for shareholders, rather than a race by migrating corporations to the 
bottom—that is, to permissive state laws that enticed managers at the ex-
pense of shareholders, who presumably needed protection by federal law 
or revisions in Delaware law.10 This was a victory for a serious theory, in 
the sense that it was a view contrary to conventional wisdom. 
However, as every statistics student learns, correlation is not causa-
tion. Perhaps there was indeed a race to the bottom, but migration to Del-
aware signaled a forthcoming corporate takeover that would benefit share-
holders and overwhelm any decrease to be associated with management-
friendly Delaware law. The migrating firms might have done yet better in 
the stock market if they had remained in their pre-Delaware states. It 
would have been nice to have counterfactuals. Perhaps out of every 100 
firms on their way to Delaware, there was some way to bar a significant 
number of randomly chosen firms from relocating, and then to compare 
the change in their market prices with those that relocated. Alternatively, 
perhaps there was a way to isolate firms that relocated to Delaware and 
did not merge—though it would be hard to know whether new and old 
shareholders (incorrectly) anticipated a merger or other significant trans-
action. A generation or two later, the literature is still full of empirical work 
on these causation questions. Over time it became generally accepted that 
Delaware was good for shareholders, though there are enough confound-
ing variables—including the availability of other states of incorporation, 
the expected decisions of Delaware courts, and the intervention of federal 
law—to keep corporate law scholars busy, and their readers exhausted.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 8. For one take on this, see Tom Ginsburg & Thomas J. Miles, Empiricism and the Rising 
Incidence of Coauthorship in Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1785. There is likely to be some push-
back based on the likelihood that a focus on impressive data sets might be unfair because well-
connected young scholars have better access to data sets. 
 9. Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Devel-
opments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982). 
 10. For an explanation of these competing theories and a review of the associated early 
empricial work, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory 
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 469 nn.1-2 (1987). 
 11. Early work, and the entire field, is best credited to Roberta Romano, but useful at-
tractions include William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s 
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Most empirical work in law and economics, and especially work that 
tries to validate or invalidate claimed causal connections (whether a move 
to Delaware will be good for shareholders, for instance), is regression anal-
ysis, a form of hypothesis testing (or rejection). Consider, for example, a 
store (or army or prison) that wants to decide what size men’s clothes to 
stock. Over many years, the height of men has been recorded as they enter 
military service, and we have learned that there is a normal (Bell curve) 
distribution of heights around a (current) median of about 5’10”. This clas-
sic example of a normal distribution means that the 25th and 75th percentiles 
(2 inches shorter and taller as it turns out) have the same number of people, 
and the 10th and 90th percentiles (4 inches) also match one another in size.12 
The same neat distribution holds for women, for people at different ages 
of life, in different countries, and in different years, though the median 
changes (it was 2 inches lower in the United States one hundred years ago, 
and it is now higher in the Netherlands, and so forth). Our buyer might 
need to adjust for the income of people expected to wear these uniforms, 
but that too is easily done. If the buyer needed to acquire clothes to be used 
many years in the future, the task gets harder, because the median height 
has increased over time, and may continue to do so as recent immigrants 
are encompassed. Increases in the median are usually thought to be the 
result of diet and other factors,13 and while it went through periods in which 
the rate of this increase seemed regular or predictable, it now appears to 
have leveled, and certainly to have slowed. This s-curve phenomenon (pre-
dictable and accelerated increase followed by a slowing increase and then 
a leveling) is true of so many things that long-term predictions are nearly 
impossible without some theory about the limits of growth.14 There were, 
by way of other examples, a rapid, exponential increase in the demand for 
horses, and then for trains and for cars and eventually for aircraft, but in 
the first of these examples demand eventually decreased rather steeply, 
and in the third example it has leveled off. Note that some of these de-
creases, like empirical work itself, were accompanied by decreasing costs. 
Bicycles and regressions might be cheaper to produce over time, and yet 
they can decrease in importance because demand changes, as substitutes 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limits of Delaware Corpo-
rate Law: Internal Affairs, Federal Forum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi, 75 BUS. LAW. 1319 
(2020); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate 
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); Robert B. Thompson, Delaware’s Disclosure: Moving the 
Line of Federal-State Corporate Regulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 167; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corpo-
rate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002). 
 12. See Max Roser, Cameron Appel & Hannah Ritchie, Human Height, OUR WORLD 
IN DATA (May 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/human-height [https://perma.cc/KZY9-8DXN]. 
 13. The language in the text is a bit imprecise in order to save space. The underlying 
point is that we usually have evidence of correlation, and there is then some guesswork about 
causation. 
 14. See VACLAV SMIL, GROWTH: FROM MICROORGANISMS TO MEGACITIES (2019). 
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become available or buyers learn that bicycles (or regression results) are 
less useful than first imagined. S-curves can often be explained after the 
fact, but exceptions abound. Few of us would bet that climate warming will 
level off or decrease simply because the use of fuels that are currently pop-
ular is likely to level off. 
Regression techniques are at their best when the real world that lies 
“beneath” studied observations follows a linear pattern—either because it 
is strictly linear or because it is exponential and can therefore be turned 
into a linear pattern through a logarithmic transformation.15 For good rea-
son, the regression line will be created with a technique that minimizes 
least squares (of the errors, or observations, that do not exactly fit the line 
revealed by the data).16  
The major problem emphasized here is that common regression tech-
niques work best with data that fits a straight line of the kind just described, 
but requires serious adjustment if the underlying distribution is non-linear. 
I will emphasize, or simply toss out in the interest of conserving words, two 
variants from any convenient distribution, such as a straight line or a nor-
mal (Gaussian) distribution. First, actual distributions may follow power 
(or scaling) laws, so that the tail (or even both tails) of a distribution is 
much steeper than that found (or expected even) in an exponential growth 
model. Power-law distributions are often traced back to Pareto’s observa-
tion that 80% of Italian land was owned by 20% of its people, and then this 
80/20 “rule” was (and still remains) noticed in an extraordinary number of 
situations. Every business school student learns that 80% of a manufac-
turer’s sales (and complaints!) comes from 20% of customers. Some read-
ers are familiar with power laws like Zipf’s law about the population of 
cities (the largest is observed to be twice the size of the second largest, and 
that second one is twice the size of the third largest and so forth), the prev-
alence of particular words in the written work of virtually all known lan-
guages, and even observations about the relative citations of academic ar-
ticles. In these examples, the distributions are right skewed, and thus even 
steeper at the tail than would be expected from a merely exponential func-
tion.17  
There is a substantial and fascinating literature on power laws, but for 
present purposes the thing to see is fairly intuitive. It is that regressions, or 
least-squared methods quite generally, will produce serious mistakes when 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 15. Thus, if a worker’s salary increases by 3% a year, the dollar increase in year 10 will 
be much greater than that in year 2, but the lifetime income pattern can be formulated as a straight 
line because of the regular 3% change. Linear regressions tend to be more useful than non-linear 
curves for reasons that can be intuited but that are not critical here.  
 16. In summary, minimizing least squares, when working with linear data under certain 
assumptions, provides the best linear unbiased estimates. See Quinlan Lee, OLS, BLUE and the 
Gauss Markov Theorem, U. WATERLOO ECON. SOC’Y (Mar. 1, 2017), http://uweconsoc.com/ols-
blue-and-the-gauss-markov-theorem [https://perma.cc/4V3G-KHGT]. 
 17. For these and many other examples of power laws, see William J. Reed, The Pareto, 
Zipf and Other Power Laws, 74 ECON. LETTERS 15 (2001); and PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: 
THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1997). 
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the tail of a distribution is steeper than expected. Errors will begin to fall 
farther and farther from one side of the line fitted to the expected distribu-
tion, and the model will experience high heteroscedasticity. One way to 
think about this is that if the empiricist is fitting a function to data with an 
expectation of some exponential function at the tail, least squares—which 
is the backbone of regression techniques and thus of empirical work in law 
and economics—will do an increasingly poor job when that tail is really 
much steeper than what was anticipated by observations marking an ear-
lier shape of the distribution. The errors will be greater as we move along, 
and each error (whether or not squared) adds bias to the fitted curve.  
A yet easier way to think of this is that if only the regression technique 
accounted for the presence of a power-law function, it could do a much 
better job. But how do we, or the statistical packages used by beginners,18 
know when we are facing a power law or other inconvenient function? The 
answer is that a theory is required. Indeed, the power-law literature is full 
of attempts to explain observed power laws. Some look for evolutionary 
explanations19 and some to random-walk theory20 (which can present an-
other problem for empiricists), but this is obviously not the place to con-
vince the reader to share my fascination with power-law distributions. In-
stead, the point is that it is more important to understand why power-law 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 18. Stata, SAS, R, and other regression software often require (depending on the type of 
regression) additional coding packages which are user-written and circulated online. 
 19. A famous example, Kleiber’s Law, demonstrates both the explanatory significance 
of power laws and the difficulty academics face when they identify such a law. Max Kleiber found 
that animal metabolism, long known to be correlated with body size, scales at 3/4 power of the 
animal’s body size, contradicting the previous wisdom that metabolism scales at a 2/3 power, owing 
to the relationship between surface area and volume (the way a 3x3x3 foot box contains 27 cubic 
feet). Kleiber’s law has since been refuted and reinvigorated countless times. See Karl J. Niklas & 
Ulrich Kutschera, Kleiber’s Law: How the Fire of Life Ignited Debate, Fueled Theory, and Ne-
glected Plants as Model Organisms, 10 PLANT SIGNALING & BEHAV. 7 (2015). There is surely 
some relationship between metabolic rates and body size (or surface area or perhaps a combina-
tion of the two), as theory suggests, but it is not clear that evolutionary pressure leads to a universal 
relationship of the kind Kleiber announced. Moreover, at some point, the observations motivated 
by Kleiber’s Law, often suggesting log-log transformations where power-law distributions are to 
be expected, smack of some retrofitting. After all, if we first try a linear regression, then a log 
transformation, and then log-log transformations, eventually something will fit the available data 
with some reasonable level of confidence, or so it seems. This appears to be what transpired, as 
new data about previously ignored species toppled the previously announced law, or suggested 
another. In any event, even after all these years, Kleiber’s Law and its “exceptions” continue to 
defy straightforward theories. Early observations suggested a particular distribution and helped 
develop a convincing theory, and then further data challenged that theory but has not quite pro-
duced an improved theory. As is currently the case in law and economics, young empiricists were 
complimented for the acquisition and development of new data sets, but the quest for a compre-
hensive theory regarding this relatively small question has not succeeded. The Kleiber’s Law in-
dustry also presents an interesting counterexample to the familiar claim that “it takes a theory to 
beat a theory.”  
 20. A well-known starting point is PAUL H. COOTNER, THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF 
STOCK MARKET PRICES (1964). Random growth theory has also been applied to the hot topic of 
growing income inequality at the right tail, though other theories, like super-star returns, currently 
seem ascendant. Xavier Gabaix et al., The Dynamics of Inequality, 84 ECONOMETRICA 2071 
(2016). 
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(or other) distributions arise, in order to understand where else they might 
be found. Without such theories, common regression techniques are mis-
leading and the empiricist’s conclusions will soon fail to replicate. In short, 
regression techniques (with recognizable distributions) form the backbone 
of empirical work in law and economics, and these regressions are often 
unjustified—and likely lead to misleading results. 
II. The Mistaken Assumption of Single Distributions 
A second important reason to be skeptical of regressions, and espe-
cially so in law and economics, is that true distributions may change course 
over time or over another variable. Instead of fitting a curve over all avail-
able data (even after strategically and perhaps unwisely excluding some 
outliers21), so that many observations are shoved into one peg, in reality 
these observations are likely to fit one pattern for one period of time. Then, 
after some intervening event, the observations might fit another pattern, 
depending perhaps on another identifiable variable (such as a different 
time period). A theory is required in order to know whether to fit a curve 
to all the available data, or rather to fit a curve to an identifiable subset of 
the data, and then to expect a different distribution for the remainder. In 
the process, the theory will identify the transition point at which we need 
to begin the new distribution. This is easy to imagine if some, but only some 
of the data, follows a power law. A curve may simultaneously fit the rela-
tively flat tail (only the first part of the data) very well, but then be a poor 
fit for the spike-end of the distribution. In artificial intelligence and other 
fields, this is sometimes referred to as a “transition,” meaning that begin-
ning at some point, or subject to some variable, the data can be divided, or 
split, in two or more parts, so that different distributions best fit the several 
parts.  
Note that this is more than a turning or inflection point. In the absence 
of a theory or two, the empiricist will not know how to divide the treatment 
and control groups, and unbalanced groups will be created. For example, 
Pareto’s original intuition about wealth distribution does not offer an ex-
cellent fit for subsequent data about wealth, and it has been observed that 
                                                                                                                                                                                
21. Omitting outliers haphazardly can be disastrous, especially when the assumed under-
lying distribution (typically a normal distribution for linear regressions) does not match up with 
reality. See, e.g., Carlos Fajardo et al., One Needs to Be Careful When Dismissing Outliers: A 
Realistic Example, U. TEX. EL PASO DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI. (2016), https://scholar-
works.utep.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2044&context=cs_techrep [https://perma.cc/JYS2-
DY6V] (providing an example of a standard technique for omitting outliers that destroys the value 
of available data); see also Harvey J. Motulsky & Ronald E. Brown, Detecting Outliers When 
Fitting Data with Nonlinear Regression—a New Method Based on Robust Nonlinear Regression 
and the False Discovery Rate, 7 BMC BIOINFORMATICS 123 (2006) (explaining the difficulties of 
non-linear outlier omission and providing a possible solution). The empiricist can try to rely on a 
method announced before observing the data set, can instead use personal judgment, or can try to 
partner with a theory about the available data and issue.  
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if one applies an exponential distribution to a majority of the population, 
and then a power-law distribution just to the right tail, the overall fit is 
superior.22 Two distributions are better than one, so to speak, and theorists 
have worked on theories that explain or suggest this bifurcation. In law, we 
might imagine that the distribution of data will follow one curve in some 
states and a very different curve in others. Alternatively, data might follow 
one curve before a certain date and another after it. Similarly, results might 
follow a different distribution for serious crimes than for minor transgres-
sions. Empiricists are quick to think of this claim as one calling for holding 
the omitted variable constant, but this is not enough. The very distribution 
of the data might be different on one side of the excluded variable than the 
other. By different, I do not mean that the data is bimodal or multimodal, 
for that describes situations in which there is a single distribution with sev-
eral peaks. The problem instead is that data might, to repeat the earlier 
example, follow a power-law distribution after a given event, or depending 
on one or more variables, so that we need to look for (at least) two distri-
butions: one “before” the event and one following it. But, we do not know 
the dividing line without theory.23 Some data is not necessarily better than 
no data if the available data is inspected for the wrong thing. 
Another way to think about this is to ask about the nature of omitted 
variable problems. An empiricist might want to study whether increasing 
expected prison sentences brings about a decrease in crime. Imagine that 
the empiricist shows a strong relationship between threatened sentences 
and crime rates. The work may have taken advantage of a natural experi-
ment in which the legislature instituted more severe sentences that were 
widely advertised. The implication is that, subject to various costs and ben-
efits, it might (or might not) be worthwhile to increase penalties for con-
victed criminals. When such a finding is presented at an economics work-
shop, it is inevitable that most of the hands raised point to omitted 
variables that might be critical. Perhaps there was more investment in po-
lice forces over time, and this is what discouraged criminal activity. Maybe 
some prisons offered better job training or other conditions that made a 
prison sentence less of a deterrent. Perhaps juries responded to the adver-
tised increase in required sentences by being more likely to find defendants 
innocent.  
The empiricist will have foreseen many of these objections and will 
have tried to test their influence with various regressions. In some 
                                                                                                                                                                                
22. See Thomas Lux, Emergent Statistical Wealth Distributions in Simple Monetary Ex-
change Models: A Critical Review, in ECONOPHYSICS OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS 51 (A. 
Chatterjee et al., eds., 2005). 
23. To avoid retrofitting, there might be cases (like wealth distribution) where two dis-
tributions, and an apparent transition, seem to work well. With some imagination a theory can be 
developed, and then tested on future data about wealth distributions. Again, the point here is not 
to say that data is useless, but rather that data and theory working together, sometimes in one 
order and sometimes in the other, is likely to be an important part of the future of law and eco-
nomics. 
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disciplines this is easier than in others, because there are many observa-
tions. Omitted variables cannot simply be tested on their own, because 
there are likely to be joint and confounding effects among them. Variable 
A might be important only when variable B is also present, and variable C 
might be offset by the presence of variable B, and so forth. The fewer the 
observations, the more difficult it is to test these effects. Empiricists are 
likely to compensate for this shortage of observations, and even for the 
absence of any observations, with certain combinations of variables, by in-
terpolations—but this requires some assumptions about underlying distri-
butions.  
To be sure, extrapolations and interpolations are reasonable when 
there are straight lines to be imagined on the basis of theories. But with 
zig-zags or other omitted variables that completely change the underlying 
distribution on one side of the line to be filled in by interpolation, the pro-
cess is misleading or simply impossible. This is especially so when the em-
pirical work is said to have implications for further increases in prison sen-
tences. There are many reasons to think that what is true about behavior 
when a sentence is increased from three years to five, and then from five 
to nine, will tell us little about what to expect for an increase from nine to 
twelve years. Indeed, even if observations about increasing sentences from 
three to five, and then from nine to twelve years, fit one familiar distribu-
tion, there is great room for error with a nonlinear regression when at-
tempting to say something about an intermediate increase from five to nine 
years, and especially so when this increase in sentence duration (and asso-
ciated criminal behavior) is to take place in years following the studied ob-
servations.24 Unfortunately, it is common for empiricists to lump the entire 
available sample, often for lack of a theory; this lumping is prone to rever-
sal, a topic discussed in Part III. And if the empiricist tries to account for 
years of prison in this example, it is likely that unobserved counterfactuals 
come into play. 
The larger point here is that the testing of omitted variables requires 
one to identify, or even imagine, these variables, and thus to have a theory 
of how the world works. Moreover, any test of the importance of a given 
omitted variable requires the empiricist to have a theory about the under-
lying (real) distribution of data, if we had a full set of observations. The 
latter problem can sometimes be handled with very large data sets—but 
these are normally unavailable where law is concerned. Part III now turns 
to another problem associated with limited data sets. The point will again 
be that a good theory is required before saying much about a data set. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
24. Thus, if a single curve fits many increases in sentences over many years, at some point 
it would be reasonable to think it unlikely that the increase in penalty following a change from 
five to nine years would surprise us. 
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III. Limited Data and Reversals 
Most techniques for dealing with omitted variables require significant 
amounts of data. Various paths among variables and outcomes need to be 
examined.25 For example, in order to judge the importance of, or causal 
relationship between, cigarette advertising and cancer, the empiricist 
needs significant data to evaluate the degree to which advertising brings 
about (or can discourage) smoking, and then the degree to which smoking 
rather than genetic or environmental variables, or various combinations of 
these variables, does the work. Serious scientists took many years to eval-
uate these connections and to be sure that cigarette advertising (and even 
smoking) was harmful. They did this with very large data sets, but without 
easy access to controlled experiments. In law and economics, we have 
somewhat better opportunities for natural or controlled experiments, but, 
unfortunately, we have at least as many variables to confront, and much 
smaller data sets. 
As a co-author and I have emphasized,26 relatively large data sets al-
low for the divison of data and, among other things, some circling around 
omitted data concerns. When separated segments are small, any findings 
are unlikely to be statistically significant. An interesting subset of this omit-
ted variable problem concerns reversal paradoxes, where the empiricist 
can fool us (and herself) into believing (not just the wrong strength of an 
effect but even) the wrong direction of a variable’s impact. 
Imagine a firm looking to make an offer to one of two summer asso-
ciates, Kim and Kit.27 The firm decides to score the associates on assign-
ments given to them while they summer at the firm. During the first month 
of the summer, Kit is given 1 extensive corporate assignment and deemed 
to have done a poor job on it. Meanwhile, Kim is given 4 assignments in 
that department and is graded as a success on 1 of them. During the second 
month, the two are assigned to the environmental group. Kit receives 5 
assignments and succeeds on 4. Kim is judged to have successfully com-
pleted the 2 assignments given in the same department. The firm tabulates 
the reviews and decides to hire Kit because Kit impresses on 4 of the 6 
assignments, while Kim impressed partners on just 3 of the 6. But then a 
partner points out that perhaps the corporate assignments were simply 
more difficult than the tasks judged by the environmental group (difficulty 
is, after all, an omitted variable). Indeed, Kim performed better than Kit 
on the corporate assignments, and also better than Kit on the environmen-
tal projects. Each department would prefer Kim over Kit, even though 
Kit’s overall score was superior. This is a classic reversal paradox. In this 
                                                                                                                                                                                
25. A surprisingly simple yet helpful way to conceptualize this is with causal models used 
in combination with regression techniques. See PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 135-65. 
26. Fagan & Levmore, supra note 5. 
27. The example here extends one constructed in Fagan & Levmore, supra note 5, at 26-
28. 
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example, the reversal easily came about because the summer associates 
were not (and probably could not be) given the same assignments, and not 
even the same number of assignments in each department. Note that a fur-
ther, or double, reversal paradox is possible, once we allow for other omit-
ted variables. Perhaps partners tend to give high scores in the morning, and 
Kit was always evaluated in the afternoon. Had both candidates for em-
ployment been evaluated in the morning, it might have been Kit who 
would have been thought superior in the morning and also in the after-
noon, and indeed by both departments.  
There is no end to the omitted variable problem, and its capacity to 
change results. Even if Kim and Kit had been given the same assignments, 
from the same partner and at the same time of day, reversal would continue 
to be a danger because of the candidates’ dissimilar innate abilities and 
characteristics, as well as the mix of cases assigned to them, and the kind 
of work the firm expects to have in the future. Kim may be bilingual and 
able to complete immigration cases and cross-border tax cases more 
quickly than Kit. But Kit may be better at managing work-life balance and 
coping with stress than is Kim. Any model that omits variables that account 
for those dissimilarities is fragile. 
Again, it is common to question researchers about omitted variables. 
In the little example offered here, designed to highlight the fragility of 
models based on a small number of observations, when Kim is preferred 
after the initial analysis of performance, someone whose intuition was to 
favor Kit might have pointed out that Kit’s assignments were more difficult 
or that Kit was evaluated by partners who tended to be tough graders. If 
the omitted variable were properly included, the result would have been 
different. But in most cases this would mean that one department would 
favor Kit over the declared winner, Kim. The overall scores might be dif-
ferent, with some disputes about how to weigh the factors that contributed 
to these scores. The remarkable thing about the special case of a reversal 
(or Simpson’s) paradox is that an omitted variable causes both depart-
ments to favor one result, while the overall, combined score still favors the 
opposite result, even when all known variables are included. The practical 
and often startling lesson is that even when an empirical study is ques-
tioned because of some omitted variable, and that variable is included in 
further study, the result may still favor X over Y, even though Y is superior 
to X in settings for which data is available. This will not occur if one knows 
exactly how to weigh one or more omitted variables, but the weight itself 
is often unknown or unmeasurable and can be thought of as an additional 
omitted variable. Assigning a weight or properly modeling a relationship 
is often difficult, and it is hard or even impossible to know when it has been 
done correctly. 
Reversal paradoxes should be understood as a subset of the problem 
of omitted variables, but it is a particularly interesting subset both because 
of the startling reversals and because these problems are more difficult to 
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solve than other omitted variable problems that can be decoded with addi-
tional testing and clever study design. In some cases the larger set of data 
is what matters, and in other cases the divided data ought to carry the day. 
In the example just offered, I think readers would have agreed that Kim 
ought to be hired, once it was shown that both departments favored Kim; 
agreement is less likely after the time-of-day variable is introduced. Divid-
ing and validating data is a practice that avoids many problems in empirical 
work, and it can reduce the risk of reversals. If there are 20,000 patients 
with a disease, and a scientist wants to test combinations of drugs, it is usu-
ally wise to find the winning combination on a group of 10,000 randomly 
chosen patients, and then test this finding by applying it to the previously 
untested, or set-aside, 10,000. In the necessarily smaller case, if Kim and 
Kit are evaluated over multiple summers and some term-time opportuni-
ties to work for the firm, and Kit earns higher total scores, it is less likely 
that Kim was unknowingly given more difficult assignments or graders, or 
was evaluated at an unlucky time of day, enough to reverse the result 
reached by taking total scores.28 A hidden reversal paradox is less likely as 
the number of comparisons increases. Note that what we think of as a con-
ventional division (here, by law firm department or by summers, or both) 
is hardly random, and there are many ways to divide the candidates’ per-
formances. Data division, followed by validation, is almost always a good 
and workable idea when big data are available,29 but it is critical to have a 
random division of the data. This has become a best practice in modern 
data analysis, but it has not yet come to law and economics. The larger and 
more obvious point is that law and economics empiricism is especially 
likely to be unpleasantly surprised by reversal paradoxes because it often 
makes use of relatively small data sets. The problem is acute when non-
linear regressions are in play. 
IV. Theory-Data Interdependence 
I have emphasized that the possibility of inconvenient distributions 
and multiple and unforeseen omitted variables should cast doubt on many 
conclusions normally attributed to empirical work. This Essay, like some 
work in artificial intelligence, thus leads to the idea that data and theory 
need to work together.30 Data can show associations but not causation, un-
less the empiricist knows what to inspect. Even then, the empiricist faces 
                                                                                                                                                                                
28. Similarly, a track coach may seek the fastest runner for the team by averaging times 
in a given race. One runner may have the lowest average time, but another may win when the 
running path includes hills, when the weather is cool, when the race is run in the morning, and 
when the race is run indoors. But there are other ways to divide the races, and these hidden vari-
ables can bring about reversals. But see infra note 29. 
29. Predictive models are generally trained and tested with set-aside data. Current tech-
niques, such as k-fold cross-validation, split the data into a number of random partitions for esti-
mating model performance; accuracy rates are assessed for each partition, or fold, to determine 
adjustments to the model.  
30. See PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 349-53. 
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an uphill climb. At the same time, the observation about data-theory inter-
dependence raises the question of where theories come from, and also 
points to the importance of asking whether a theory precedes or follows 
data investigation. 
In some cases a theory is so convincing that it can survive the difficul-
ties of confirmatory data. A counterintuitive theory is probably more val-
uable than a counterintuitive and one-time empirical finding. Consider, for 
example, the idea of “winner’s curse.” In a standard and familiar English 
auction, the winner is the one who submits the highest bid, and only the 
winner pays (the amount bid). It is likely that with many bidders, the me-
dian bidder’s valuation is a good estimate of the market value of the item 
up for auction.31 As it turns out, this “wisdom of crowds” claim can be 
demonstrated in a class to amazed or amused students with such regularity 
that we might think of it as empricially verified by playing game after game 
(with real money in order to avoid claims that fun games do not cast light 
on the real world). In any event, if the median bidder is likely to arrive at 
something close to the correct valuation, it is apparent that the high bidder, 
or auction “winner,” is likely to overvalue the item and bid up the price to 
the point of overpayment.  
More serious empirical evidence, away from a class of inexperienced 
bidders with mixed motives, is difficult to obtain. For one thing, seasoned 
participants will learn to adjust for the winner’s curse; one who values an 
item at twenty, might learn to bid only up to fifteen, depending on his ex-
perience in prior auctions or, if mathematically inclined, on his assessment 
of the number of bidders and the distribution of expected values. Over 
time, then, the winner’s curse may disappear, or potential bidders may 
learn from their mistakes and avoid auctions, up to the point where the 
seller no longer uses auctions. The winner’s curse logic is so strong that 
empirical evidence is probably unnecessary. On the other hand, it is only 
fair to note that the theoretical insight came about because of observations 
in the field.32 
I feel obliged to point out that winner’s curse as applied to reported 
results is yet another reason to be skeptical of empirical claims. If empiri-
cists are confident of a result when it meets some threshold, like a ninety-
                                                                                                                                                                                
31. Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (1988). 
Winner’s curse is an offshoot of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, an idea that may also be obviously 
correct, once thought through, such that empirical verification is probably unnecessary. David 
Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34-35 (1996). 
32. On the history of winner’s curse and empirical observations leading to its formation 
and then testing, see R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. 
LIT. 699 (1987). When a passing observation inspires thoughtful analysis and then a new theory, 
as it did in the case of winner’s curse, we might say that a kind of bad empirical work (with no 
controls, a small data set, and no division of data) brought about a theory (which turned out to be 
difficult to test). This seems quite common, but it is an advertisement for intellectual curiosity 
rather than for serious empirical work. 
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five percent chance that the connection it finds is not the product of ran-
domness, then it stands to reason that the finding overstates the likely ex-
istence of a non-random relationship. Along with the other problems noted 
earlier in this Essay, it is easy to see why empirical law and economics is 
likely to face a replication crisis. Some attempts at replication will fail be-
cause of previously omitted variables, some because of unrecognized 
power-law (or other) distributions, and some because only a subset of re-
sults has been reported.33 In the latter case, the replication crisis may seem 
less serious, inasmuch as an effect is correctly identified, albeit misesti-
mated. But where costs and benefits are concerned, the strength of an ef-
fect is important and misestimation may as well be considered part of a 
replication problem. This can be thought of as a form of regression to the 
mean; the advertised claim is likely to be an outlier. It is more meaningful 
when the empiricist expresses confidence that x > y or that x is associated 
with y, than when the empiricts says that every additional unit of v is likely 
to bring about some number of units of w. The problem described here is 
of course exacerbated by the familiar complaint about the difficulty of pub-
lishing papers showing statistically insignificant results.34 The median pa-
per is not the median statistical study. Moreover, it is difficult to adjust 
correctly for this bias. 
It is commonly believed that a theory, or hypothesis, has little value 
unless it can be tested, but testing is often not easy. This reality devalues 
empirical work at least as much as it casts doubt on theoretical claims. A 
positive prediction is subect to the objection that some other variable 
might explain an observed result. Similarly, a negative result does not 
prove much if the proposed test is itself confounded by an unexpected 
omitted variable. Thus, the theorist is frequently asked, “What would 
prove you wrong?” and yet the unwanted result may not prove the theory 
wrong if it is the product of an unanticipated variable.  
To be sure, however imperfect empirical work may be, positive results 
usually and correctly add to the likelihood that the theory is correct. We 
can think of this as an example of Bayesian updating. If, for example, the 
theorist claims that higher taxes will lead to less investment in a jurisdic-
tion, and this is indeed observed, the skeptic might name a hundred other 
reasons why investment declined. And yet, if multiple tests or natural ex-
periments repeatedly show reduced investment, it is sensible to think that 
the theory about the impact of higher taxes might indeed be correct. Cau-
sation has hardly been demonstrated to a thinking person’s satisfaction, 
but even the most skeptical observer will be less likely to wager that 
                                                                                                                                                                                
33. The need for replication might suggest an increase in demand for empirical work, and 
along with decreasing costs of production, this might suggest that empirical work will increase 
rather than decline in relative terms, as suggested here. On the other hand, it is rare for demand 
to increase for things when they are shown to be of lower value than previously imagined.  
34. Ana Mlinarić et al., Dealing with the Positive Publication Bias: Why You Should Re-
ally Publish Your Negative Results, 27 BIOCHEMIA MEDICA 3 (2017). 
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investment will not decline the next time taxes are increased, even in pre-
viously untested jurisdictions. 
It is plain that a theory can be made more attractive with supporting 
data, despite the skeptic’s objection that a regression result suffers from 
some omitted variables. At the same time, a theory is often less easily re-
jected in the face of conflicting data. This is because an attractive theory 
changes our perceptions, or priors, on its own. In any event, when theory 
and data evolve together, our understanding of phenomena is improved. 
Each one alone does some work, but data alone is unconvincing, while the-
ory alone is, I believe, sometimes convincing – and especially so if it is dif-
ficult to think of a workable experiment or regression analysis that will 
come close to bringing matters to rest. The most we can say is that theories 
can be enhanced or disfavored because of empirical work, while data can 
to a more limited degree suggest new theories that might be tested. In 
terms of the evolution of law and economics, it is no accident that a gener-
ation of theorists was followed by a generation of empiricists. But in similar 
fashion, a generation dominated by empiricists is soon likely to be followed 
by a re-emergence of theorists. Ironically, this too is a theory that is not 
easily tested.35  
It may be useful to offer a simple example, chosen almost at random, 
from practical matters that law and economics would like to influence, in 
order to demonstrate its practical importance. A defendant facing a serious 
criminal charge would like to know whether to choose a bench trial or take 
advantage of the right to a jury trial; similarly, in many civil cases there is 
an opportunity to insist on a jury trial.36 A typical empirical study would 
show conviction (or civil liability) rates in various states, and try to say 
something about when defendants should prefer bench trials. Conven-
tional wisdom focuses on cases where a legal technicality might favor the 
defendant and suggests that it is in these cases that a bench trial is to be 
preferred. In civil cases, a sophisticated approach might look at the wealth 
of the defendant, the results in previous cases assigned to a given judge, 
and so forth. There is a large body of data, compared with many other de-
cisions facing a litigant, but this volume quickly declines once the empiri-
cist (or artificial intelligence), aiming to learn about the impact of a jury 
trial, sets to work on the relevance of a particular factor, including the state 
in which the trial is to take place; the gender of the defendant, plaintiff, or 
judge; and the apparent social status of these parties, not to mention their 
                                                                                                                                                                                
35. One objection to this claim is that empirical methods have improved greatly over the 
last generation (an undefined time period here), but it is hard to say the same thing about theories. 
The common view that theorists in law and economics have plucked the low hanging fruit, and 
this makes it more difficult for newcomers is, however, offset by the tendency of new empiricists 
to over-claim in the interest of making a splash or getting accepted by law journals. 
36. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sen-
tences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 959 (2005). 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:612 2021 
630 
choices of what to wear or how loudly to speak in court. Various empirical 
studies also claim that the time of day matters, as might the political per-
suasion of the judge, the size of the jury, the selection of jury members, and 
so forth.37 The list of plausible variables is astonishingly great, and we must 
take into account interactions among these variables. In addition, both the 
jury and opposing counsel might learn something from whether a party 
chooses to forego the right to a jury; it is easy to see that a party might in 
some situations benefit by demonstrating that it has chosen or rejected a 
jury trial with the flip of a coin. In a sense, the party is trying to correct for 
what might be seen as selection bias.  
It is noteworthy that what is typically at stake here is the question of 
whether to settle a case or to accept a plea bargain, and these decisions are 
not all-or-nothing, but surely depend on the size of the offer that is made. 
On the one hand, this need to understand the scale of an effect suggests 
why data alone is unlikely to get us very far. Moreover, an empiricist who 
aims not to help one side or the other in these cases, but to improve the 
legal system, faces an even greater problem. This empiricist wants to know 
when juries are likely to reach the right result. In turn, this requires some 
knowledge of whether a defendant was indeed guilty or negligent. This in-
formation is hard to obtain and makes the entire venture yet more difficult. 
It is tempting to say that difficult questions about medicine are, for the 
empiricist, far easier than the most straightforward binary questions in law. 
Empiricists in law and economics seem likely to study these variables and 
produce many doctoral degrees in the process, but it is doubtful that much 
that is privately or socially useful will be learned other than a conclusion 
that either overclaims or concludes that “further study is needed.” 
At the same time, this typical, or apparently straightforward, sort of 
case (involving the decision to choose a jury trial), beginning with a rela-
tively large data set, does not support the central claim of this Essay. I 
aimed to show that theory and data need to work together, but the example 
in this Part is no more supportive of theory than it has been of data. Theo-
ries, or hypotheses, about the impact of juries are easy to manufacture—
though an “obvious” theory alone is unlikely to produce a doctoral degree 
or a tenured position. No theorist gets much credit for a claim about why a 
requirement of unanimity might be better for the defendant. And no the-
orist on her own gets any credit for opining that judges are more likely to 
make certain decisions before or after lunch. It is too easy to state these 
hypotheses before or after any empirical evidence, and indeed the first 
claim is unlikely to get attention even if it comes with supporting empirical 
evidence. Even a more surprising result can be shrugged off; if it could be 
demonstrated that judge or jury decisions were influenced by time of day 
                                                                                                                                                                                
37. Unsurprisingly, these results get attention and are then often found not to replicate, 
likely because of an omitted variable. With regard to the time of day claim about judging, see 
Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in the Analysis of Parole Deci-
sions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E833 (2011). 
The Eventual Decline of Empirical Law and Economics 
631 
or gender, for instance, once judges learned of these claimed biases it is 
likely that there would be some adjustment. As in the case of winner’s 
curse, or many theories (and empirical findings) in finance, the real test of 
a result is whether it applies to set-aside, and in many cases to future, data. 
The combination of all these difficulties suggests that an interesting (non-
obvious) theory followed by the absence of repeatedly contrasting data is 
an imperfect but promising way to think about the co-evolution of theory 
and data in our quest to better understand law or to change it for the better. 
Note that this Essay is not claiming that all questions are similar to the 
question of jury choice. The jury example was chosen because it offers a 
much larger set of data than is usually available to law and economics 
scholars, and large data sets are often needed to overcome the problems 
posed by omitted variables. I continue to have faith in theories like win-
ner’s curse, even though large data sets might prove to be tarnished, as 
discussed earlier. The value of such theories comes from their surprise and 
plausibility. 
Conclusion 
The aim here has not been to denigrate regressions, but rather to 
make the case for the co-evolution, and even co-determination, of theoret-
ical and empirical insights. Law and economics has come to be dominated 
by regression analysis, and new entrants to the field more often than not 
make their reputations with this subset of empirical work. Most of these 
projects make questionable assumptions. When empiricists are challenged 
about the assumptions implicit in their models, they often respond that 
they are simply following the accepted practices in the field. In my own 
experience, to question these models and the conclusions they suggest is to 
be labeled as one who is hostile to empirical work and its ascendance. This 
is unfortunate and unscientific. 
The problems with empirical law and economics do not make a case 
for unchallenged theoretical work. Weaknesses here do not make for vic-
tory there, in the realm of theory. From the beginning, theorists were chal-
lenged about their assumptions, even by generalists who needed no special 
training in economics, but who are ill-equipped to challenge empirical 
work on its terms. Empirically minded scholars insisted that a theory re-
quires empirical evidence, usually in the form of a test that could be under-
taken and that could demonstrate that the theory was false. Most of the 
arguments in this Essay have been directed at empirical work, but these 
challenges also mean that theories are weaker than might have been imag-
ined because they cannot easily be shown to be true or false. Theories can 
be imperfectly tested, and over time they gain or lose support. None of the 
problems with empirical work makes the co-evolution of, or teamwork be-
tween, empirical and theoretical work magically immune from the chal-
lenges put forward here. It is more realistic to think that our confidence in 
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theories as well as in empirical work will grow when the two work in part-
nership and point in the same direction. 
